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Abstract 
The local sphere of asylum policy, during the refugee crisis, became a key area of intervention for local govern-
ments. The existing literature on the topic has largely neglected the role of political affiliation in local asylum 
policy-making and the implications for policy implementation of mayors’ subjective understandings and decision-
making. This article aims to fill these gaps by focusing on the case of ‘socially useful works’ (SUW) for asylum-
seekers, a local policy that was defined as the Italian way to deal with the reception and integration of asylum-
seekers. The article first analyses the outputs of this policy, assessing which local governments developed SUW 
policies, what types of measures were implemented and with what policy goals. Second, by applying insights 
from Weick’s sensemaking approach and relying on semi-structured interviews conducted in the Veneto region, 
it develops an account that analyses how and why these measures were adopted. The analysis concludes, first, 
that mayors’ party affiliations are a strong predictor of how SUW policies are (or are not) implemented. Second, 
it shows that mayors are not mere passive implementers: they adapt state-level guidelines to their own aims in 
ways that powerfully shape policy implementation and its outcomes. Third, the article shows how decisions about 
the implementation of SUW policies are significantly influenced by the mayors’ diverse interpretations of the 
many anti-migrant protests against asylum-seekers, and by different identity processes, past experiences and 
social relations. 
1. Introduction 
sylum policies are an interesting case for investigating the role of mayors’ party 
affiliations in local policy-making and how mayors’ aims, motivations and under-
standings of social and political phenomena influence their decisions with regard 
to policy implementation. 
The local sphere of migration policy, indeed, became a key area of intervention for 
local governments during the refugee crisis. Reception policies are managed primarily at 
national level but, during the crisis, mayors had to decide whether to cooperate with na-
tional authorities or actively fight against the creation of reception centres, and could 
decide to develop local integration policies for asylum-seekers (Ambrosini, 2018). Not 
only did the crisis increase the relevance of the local sphere of asylum policy, but this also 
became ‘an extremely contentious one’ (Zapata-Barrero et al. 2017). The sharp rise in 
A 
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asylum-seeker flows in most European countries has led to widespread anti-migrant pro-
tests and high levels of political contestation around asylum, which make mayors’ 
decisions in this field highly visible.  
While an increasing number of scholarly works have recently focused on local asy-
lum policy-making (Jorgensen, 2012; Ambrosini, 2018), most of this literature, 
particularly in the Italian context, neglects the role of mayors’ party affiliations in local 
policy-making and the implications for policy implementation of mayors’ aims, motiva-
tions and subjective understandings. This article aims to fill these gaps by focusing on 
both local policy outputs and decision-making processes and addressing the following 
questions. First, are mayors mere implementers of schemes decided at the national level 
or do they shape the policies they adopt in significant ways? And do mayors’ political af-
filiations have any influence or impact on asylum policy adoption and implementation? 
Second, which elements shape mayors’ decisions to adopt (or not) local asylum policies 
and their policy goals? 
The article specifically focuses on ‘socially useful work’ projects for asylum-seekers 
(henceforth: SUW projects/ SUW policies), a key local asylum policy developed by 
mayors during the asylum crisis, entailing the voluntary involvement of asylum-seekers 
in unremunerated community service. The policy became one of the five key pillars of the 
agenda promoted by the Interior Minister Marco Minniti1 which led to the structural re-
form of the asylum system.2 The then chief of the Department of Civil Liberties and 
Immigration, Mario Morcone, defined them as ‘the Italian way to deal with the reception 
of asylum-seekers’ (Il Corriere del Veneto, 2016) and a key measure to facilitate their in-
tegration (Il Mattino, 2016). The article examines mayors’ decisions to adopt and 
implement these policies in the northern region of Veneto, where SUW projects were 
widely implemented during the asylum crisis.  
The article is articulated in three sections. It begins by explaining the analytical ap-
proach and methodology adopted. It then assesses policy outputs, analysing which local 
governments developed SUW policies, the types of measures implemented and mayors’ 
policy goals. Finally, it accounts for these differences in policy outputs through the analy-
sis of the specificities of mayors’ decision-making approaches. The analysis shows, first, 
that mayors’ party affiliations are a strong predictor of how SUW policies are (or are not) 
implemented. Second, in line with well-established findings in the literature in public 
policy analysis (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973), it argues that mayors are not mere pas-
sive implementers of state-level guidelines and rather adapt them to their aims, in ways 
that powerfully shape policy implementation. Third, it shows that mayors’ decisions 
about how to implement SUW policies are significantly influenced by their diverse inter-
pretations of the causes of the many anti-migrant protests around them, and by different 
identity processes, past experiences and social relations. 
                                                             
1 Source: https://openmigration.org/en/analyses/5-things-to-know-about-italys-plan-for-immigration/. 
2 Law Decree 13/2017, then converted into Law 46/2017. 
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2. Analytical Approach and Rationale 
An increasing number of scholars have recently focused on local asylum policy-making, 
in Italy and beyond, teasing out some key features of local governments’ responses to the 
asylum crisis and examining their consequences on localities (Ambrosini, 2013; Doom-
ernik and Glorius, 2016). These studies have described a variegated reality, in which local 
governments follow pragmatic or rights-based approaches in managing immigration or 
rather decide to adopt ‘policies of exclusion’ (Jorgensen, 2012; Steen, 2016; Ambrosini, 
2018; McMahon, 2019). Despite the increasing number of contributions in this field, at 
least two main gaps can be identified in such literature, which this article aims to address. 
On the one hand, while this literature has focused on the explanation of the variation 
and effects of local asylum policy, both the role of mayors’ political affiliations in local pol-
icy-making and their motivations and policy goals have been largely ignored. Most of the 
literature, and contributions focusing on Italy in particular, often tend to merely extrap-
olate assumptions about their nature from the observed decisions. Mayors’ decisions are 
thus often assumed to be influenced by the mobilisation of local immigrant-supporting 
organizations or anti-migrant protests (Filomeno, 2017), by conflicts with regional and 
national authorities (Scholten and Pennix, 2016), or by mayors’ ideological positions 
(Ambrosini, 2018: 117). This is despite the fact that eminent scholarly works have demon-
strated how decision-making is influenced by factors that are not necessarily evident in 
its outputs. 
On the other hand, those scholarly works that, outside the Italian context, do focus 
on local actors and decision-making, tend to focus on issue framing in policy disputes 
(Steen, 2016) and/or to move from rationalistic premises to assess actors’ choices (Lidén 
and Nyhlén, 2015). They thus assume that asylum policies ‘have an objective basis, in 
terms of quantifying local costs, the level of state subsidies and demographic effects on 
the community’ (Steen, 2016: 466), and that actors’ choices are ‘constructed in the public 
discourse, and often with symbolic connotations’ (ibid.). These assumptions, legitimate 
in other contexts, seem inappropriate for studying asylum-related decision-making pro-
cesses in situations of crisis, such as the one analysed in this article. As pointed out by a 
number of scholars (Cohen et al., 1972; Brunsson, 1985), indeed, in such situations deci-
sions must be taken quickly and with scant information and tend to be powerfully 
influenced also by actors’ interpretations of the external environment, and not merely by 
rational or strategic considerations. 
This article, therefore, aims to complement this existing literature in two main re-
spects. First, it aims to specifically investigate the role of party affiliation in asylum 
policy-making, with specific focus on the Italian context. Ambrosini (2018: 117) has ques-
tioned the existence of a clear-cut distinction in Italy between centre-right 
administrations promoting anti-migrant policies and centre-left governments promot-
ing inclusive policies. Steen (2016) reached similar conclusions in the Norwegian 
context. This article will investigate whether or not mayors affiliated with different par-
ties in Italy implemented SUW policies and whether they did so in different ways.   
Second, moving beyond the mere assessment of policy outputs, this article aims to 
account for such differences or lack of differences through the analysis of the specificities 
of mayors’ decision-making processes in situations of crisis. To investigate these pro-
cesses, the paper adopts an actor-centred constructivist perspective (Hay, 2012) which 
mainly draws concepts and ideas from Weick’s sensemaking approach (1995). This 
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approach, rarely applied to political science (Geddes and Hadj-Abdou, 2018), provides an 
alternative framework for analysing the social psychological processes through which in-
dividuals understand and assign meaning to unexpected events and act upon these 
understandings (Helms Mills et al., 2010: 182). Importantly, it is particularly suited to ex-
amining decisions in situations of crisis (Maitlis and Christianson, 2014: 58), such as the 
one analysed, where local governments were suddenly asked by Prefects to identify build-
ings to host increasing numbers of asylum-seekers, with scant information available and 
under the pressure of widespread protests against asylum-seekers. Also, unlike cognitive 
approaches that merely focus on policy frames, the sensemaking approach connects 
thought and action and captures ‘the practical activities of real people engaged in concrete 
situations of social action’ (Boden, 1994: 10). It indeed addresses both the two key ques-
tions that organizations and their members have to face in situations of crisis, related not 
only to cognition – ‘what is happening?’ – but also to action – ‘what should be done next?’ 
(Mills et al., 2010: 183). 
Weick’s ‘sensemaking framework’ (1995: 18), based on some interrelated ‘explana-
tory properties’, provides a method for analysing how individuals answer these two key 
questions. According to Weick’s first property, sensemaking is ‘grounded on identity con-
struction’ (ibid.): who individuals think they are as organizational actors in a certain 
context influences how they interpret events and act. Secondly, Weick states that sense-
making is focused on and by ‘cues’ that individuals extract from the environment in order 
to take decisions on the relevance and acceptability of information or explanations. These 
extracted cues are ‘seeds from which people develop a larger sense of what may be occur-
ring’ (ibid.: 50), meaning that actors make choices by focusing on certain elements or 
events while ignoring others. According to Weick’s third property, the opportunity for 
sensemaking, which is a comparative process, is provided by retrospection: individuals 
rely on familiar past experiences to interpret current events. In practical terms, this 
means that actors are more reluctant to project, forecast and plan solutions if these are 
‘decoupled from reflective action and history’ (ibid.: 30). Fourth, Weick argues that 
sensemaking unfolds ‘in a social context of other actors’ and is contingent upon interac-
tions with others (Weick et al., 2005: 409).  
Analysing how these properties influence mayors’ decisions provides in-depth in-
sights into why and how mayors implemented SUW policies and their policy goals. Based 
on the first property, it is expected that mayors’ decisions are influenced by perceptions 
of their institutional role, but also by their identity of members of a party or by local iden-
tity processes. The second property suggests that mayors’ decisions are influenced by 
their perceptions of the effects of asylum-seeker reception in their municipalities. Fol-
lowing the third property, past experiences in managing migration flows at the local level 
should help mayors and city officials deal with the present situation. In the absence of 
such previous definitions of the situation, asylum policies are expected to be mostly im-
plemented in a very reactive way. Finally, the last property suggests that mayors’ 
interactions with other actors in the asylum governance system – particularly if these ac-
tors are perceived as sharing similar perspectives on the issue – are expected to influence 
their interpretations and decisions.  
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3. Case selection and methods 
Veneto is an interesting ‘extreme case’ (Gerring, 2006: 89) for analysing the research 
questions posed by this article and generating hypotheses on the implementation of asy-
lum policies, for at least two reasons.  
First, the significant political variation within the region in 2017 (Figure 1) allows us 
to formulate hypotheses about the role that party affiliation plays in shaping local asylum 
policymaking during the refugee crisis. Veneto is one of the heartlands of the populist rad-
ical right Lega Nord (LN), which maintains a strong regionalist character in the region 
(Zulianello, 2019: 83). Yet the dominant position of the LN in the regional political system, 
in 2017, was contrasted by the centre-left Partito Democratico (PD), which controlled a sig-
nificant number of municipalities, and by several independent mayors, not affiliated to 
any national party. These mayors are ‘fringe actors’, who, unlike the others, do not aspire 
to govern at the national level.  
Figure 1. Political affiliation of Venetian Mayors in 2017 
 
Source: http://www.comuniverso.it 
Second, the high pressure from the asylum issue allows us to analyse decision-making 
in situations of crisis. Veneto, in 2016-2017, was indeed characterised by a harsh political 
and institutional crisis around the reception of asylum-seekers. It experienced very high 
levels of political contestation around the issue, and the highest number of anti-migrant 
protests in Italy (Lunaria, 2017), often organized by ‘anti-migrant committees’ with no po-
litical affiliation. Also, it was characterised by a very weak reception system, with a 
prevalence of emergency reception centres (CAS)3 under the control of the Prefecture, 
very few SPRAR4 centres (directly managed by local authorities), and a very unequal dis-
persal of asylum-seekers across the region (Ministry of Interior, 2017).  
The many anti-migrant protests, and pressure from anti-migrant groups, are ex-
pected to significantly influence mayors’ strategies. The very strong regional identity in 
the region is also expected to influence decisions, particularly those of right-wing mayors.   
                                                             
3 The acronym stands for: Centri di Accoglienza Straordinaria, Emergency Reception Centres. 
4 The acronym stands for: Sistema di Protezione per Richiedenti Asilo e Rifugiati, System of Protection for 
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The article draws upon an extensive document analysis of policy documents and 
newspaper articles and 33 semi-structured interviews conducted in Veneto in November 
2017. The sample of interviewees includes 14 mayors and deputy mayors from municipal-
ities that hosted reception centres; ten non-party actors directly involved in the 
implementation of SUW policies (four civil servants, four representatives of service pro-
viders, two deputy prefects) and nine experts (four academics, three NGO representatives, 
two representatives of trade unions). The sample of mayors and deputy mayors (hence-
forth: mayors) includes three LN mayors, three PD mayors, and eight independent 
mayors. Independent mayors have been grouped into three categories – ‘right-wing inde-
pendent’, ‘centre-right independent’ and ‘centre-left independent’ – using, as criteria, the 
definition of actors themselves as such, past membership of a party, and the external sup-
port received by parties at local elections. Interviewees were carefully chosen through a 
quota sampling strategy, in order to include, for each of the five groups, mayors from mu-
nicipalities of different sizes (one provincial capital, one town and one village), in different 
provinces, and hosting different types of reception centres.5 
Section 3 uses insights from all interviews and the document analysis to assess which 
local governments developed SUW policies, the types of measures implemented and 
mayors’ policy goals. Section 4 uses insights from the 14 interviews with mayors to assess 
decision-making processes: following Maitlis and Christianson (2014: 62), Weick’s 
‘sensemaking framework’ has been used as a method of analysis, on the basis of which the 
14 mayors were asked specific questions.  
In addition, Social Network Analysis (SNA) was applied to enhance the utility and 
value of Weick’s framework, under the assumption that social processes also shape inter-
pretations of events (Geddes and Taylor, 2016: 588).6 The analysis relies on data collected 
through structured questionnaires filled in by the interviewed mayors that implemented 
SUW policies, investigating their interactions with other actors in the asylum governance 
system, and the degree of similarity or difference in their perspectives on asylum-related 
issues.  
4. SUW Policies in Veneto: the main Policy Outputs 
This section assesses which local governments developed SUW policies, the types of 
measures implemented and mayors’ policy goals.  
The interview material and other sources7 reveal that mayors’ political affiliations 
are a strong predictor of whether local governments developed (or not) SUW policies, 
unlike other variables (e.g. size of municipality, province, type of reception centre 
hosted). SUW projects were implemented by local governments led by independent cen-
tre-left, independent centre-right and PD mayors (including the nine mayors 
interviewed with these political affiliations). Only a few local governments led by LN 
mayors developed these policies, including one of the three municipalities analysed. 
Most LN mayors opposed SUW projects, arguing that they entailed a disproportional 
                                                             
5 No provincial capital was governed in 2017 by a ‘right-wing independent’ administration. The group of 
‘right-wing independent’ mayors, therefore, only includes two interviewees. 
6 For an overview of applications of SNA to political phenomena see: Wasserman and Faust, 1994. 
7 Sources: Il Corriere del Veneto, 2016; Vvox, 2016; Gjergji, 2017. 
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administrative burden for the municipality and/or that these activities should rather 
have been proposed to local unemployed citizens (Vvox, 2017). The two independent 
right-wing mayors interviewed harshly criticised and opposed SUW policies.  
Table 1. Key features of the SUW policies implemented in the 14 municipalities analysed 
 
 
The analysis also provides information about the type of activities proposed to asy-
lum-seekers and about mayors’ policy goals, showing that, in the selected municipalities, 
these are both strictly linked to mayors’ political affiliations. PD mayors decided to im-
plement SUW policies with the greatest enthusiasm: as one of them explains, ‘the 
decision was so rational that we cannot even speak of a decision-making process, every-
body sustained this initiative’. All PD mayors interviewed agree that the main policy 
goals were twofold. The policies were implemented, first and foremost, to show the em-
pathy of the local government for the local population, who were annoyed by seeing 
asylum-seekers loitering inside and outside the reception centres. As a PD mayor ex-
plains: 
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We cannot deny that the rationale was that of positioning ourselves on the side 
of our citizens, who were annoyed by seeing migrants doing nothing for the 
whole day. Thus, we decided that these migrants had to give something back to 
the community that was hosting them (PD mayor). 
Furthermore, SUW policies, in the PD mayors’ view, can potentially contribute to 
reducing people’s fears of migrants, and re-orient the political debate on the reception of 
asylum-seekers: 
Initially I was very sceptical (…) then I realised that these projects contributed to 
decreasing social tensions. As a councillor from the Five Star Movement rightly 
told me, ‘if you see a person sweeping the street, you can’t be afraid of him’; you 
don’t see him as a potential enemy (PD Deputy mayor). 
These goals clearly influence the type of work in which asylum-seekers are involved, 
which in PD-led municipalities only include low-skilled auxiliary jobs such as sweeping 
the streets, painting public buildings and maintaining parks and gardens. Also, they 
have significant implications for policy implementation. First, as a city official explains, 
SUW policies are developed in ways that make asylum-seekers’ work strongly visible to 
the locals:  
The local government decided to develop this policy in a period when the context 
was quite tense, with the aim of showing to the locals that these migrants were 
doing something useful for the community, which was the reason why we made 
them work in areas where they could be highly visible (City Official). 
Some PD-led local governments also organized public ceremonies during which the 
mayor delivered certificates to the asylum-seekers, proving their participation in SUW 
projects (Cervellin, 2016).  
Second, these goals seem to influence the number of asylum-seekers involved in 
these projects and the choice of the actors involved in policy implementation:  
While others started developing these policies on a smaller scale, our mayor de-
cided that we had to ‘go big’, doing something that could be visible to everybody. 
It didn’t make much sense to develop a project just for a dozen or so asylum-seek-
ers; we had to do something important. So, he decided to involve the municipal 
company to implement these projects. And everybody praised him. (…) He was 
not the first one to develop this policy, but he systematised it and communicated 
it very well (PD deputy mayor). 
Interestingly, the only LN mayor interviewed that decided to promote SUW policies 
did so with similar goals, and with a similar emphasis on the impact of the policy on the 
local population. As he explains, the main goal of the policy was that of showing to the 
people that the local government was doing something to increase their security. 
The decisions of independent centre-left and independent centre-right mayors to 
develop SUW policies, conversely, are driven by very different goals.  
All the independent centre-left mayors interviewed explain that their goal was to 
foster the integration of asylum-seekers in the local community and labour market: 
The rationale behind this decision was to try to help these migrants learn a job, 
and to actively promote their integration in our society, thus creating the condi-
tions to avoid social marginalisation (Independent centre-left mayor). 
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As another mayor puts it, ‘we wanted to make asylum-seekers feel part of the com-
munity where they are hosted’. This approach seems to influence the type of activities 
proposed to asylum-seekers, which in these municipalities also include work in public 
libraries, schools, canteens and nursing homes. 
Centre-right independent mayors, finally, take a more ‘pragmatic approach’ and 
mostly explain that their decisions to develop SUW policies were aimed at the provision 
of services to the local population that could not be provided otherwise. As one of these 
mayors explains: 
To be sincere with you, the main reason why we involved asylum-seekers in pub-
lic utility works is because we had nobody that could perform those tasks. For 
instance, we involved them in the assistance of disabled children in the kinder-
garten, because no other local association was available. The main reason, 
therefore, is that we really need them (Independent centre-right mayor).  
For this reason, two of these mayors suggest that the involvement of asylum-seekers 
in these projects should become compulsory – an idea publicly launched by the mayor of 
Verona, Flavio Tosi.8 
5. Sensemaking Processes 
This section aims to account for the differences in the implementation of SUW policies 
identified so far through the analysis of the specificities of decision-making approaches. 
Such analysis will thus provide crucial and in-depth insights into why and how mayors 
variously implemented SUW policies, and why mayors with different political affilia-
tions were moved by different policy goals.   
To do so, I apply Weick’s ‘sensemaking framework’ (1995: 18) and, by investigating 
how Weick’s four key properties of sensemaking influence mayors’ strategies and deci-
sions, I examine how individuals develop understandings about the situation around 
them and act upon these understandings. The four properties are clearly interlinked but, 
for analytical and operational reasons, their impact on mayors’ decisions has been ana-
lysed separately. Each of the following sections thus provides complementary insights 
and clarifies different aspects of mayors’ decision-making processes.  
Identity Processes 
Identity construction ‘is at the root of sensemaking and influences the other prop-
erties of the sensemaking process’ (Helms Mills, 2003: 55). As Weick points out (1995), 
individual identities have various dimensions and, indeed, the interview material re-
veals that mayors’ decisions are influenced by their institutional identity (who they 
think they are as institutional actors), their political identity (i.e. their party member-
ship) and their sense of belonging to their state or region (cultural identity). The complex 
interaction between these dimensions helps to explain, first, the mayors’ standpoints on 
the reception of asylum-seekers and, second, why SUW policies were developed in Ve-
neto and became so popular there. 
                                                             
8 See link online at: http://www.veronasera.it/politica/tosi-salvini-tweet-migranti-protesta-trattato-
dublino-5-gennaio-2017-.html. 
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Awareness of their institutional role, the interviews reveal, leads PD mayors to mod-
erate the traditionally pro-migrant positions of their party. As one of them explained, 
‘being a mayor makes me more realistic, I’m more aware of the practical problems that 
migration flows pose and I can understand much better how people think’. Another in-
terviewee added: 
We must be welcoming towards asylum-seekers because this is the mission of a 
centre-left administration (…). [However] as local government we must con-
front reality and try to come up with responses. This doesn’t mean giving up our 
ideals, but adapting them to the situation (PD deputy mayor).  
Their strong sense of belonging to the Italian State, however, prevents PD mayors 
from opposing Prefects’ decisions to allocate asylum-seekers to their municipalities. As 
a mayor explains: 
We are convinced that local authorities, being part of the Italian State, should do 
their part and cooperate with national authorities so that the State can fulfil its 
duty to provide international protection to those who are entitled to it (PD 
mayor). 
Most independent centre-left and independent centre-right mayors, conversely, 
describe their experience as local administrators as a learning process. They state that 
their institutional role put them in ‘a privileged point of observation’ and allowed them 
to meet experts and to better understand immigration dynamics. The three independent 
centre-right mayors interviewed, despite their initial scepticism about hosting asylum-
seekers in their municipality, ended up changing their preferences. As one of them ex-
plains, ‘my institutional role allowed me to get around mystifications and journalists’ 
fabrications.  
Instead, the very strong sense of regional belonging (and ‘resentment’ towards the 
national political class) of LN mayors and, even more, independent right-wing mayors, 
leads them to harshly oppose the dispersal of asylum-seekers organized by national au-
thorities. As an independent right-wing mayor explains: 
Rome is trying by any means to destroy us (…). The only thing to do is reject the 
asylum-seekers, we must send them back to the sender. Rome should burst. In a 
metaphorical sense of course. Rome should keep all the immigrants, to really ex-
perience what it means. They should manage this problem there (Independent 
right-wing mayor). 
The coordinator of a service provider reports that, during a meeting, an LN mayor 
motivated his decision to oppose the creation of a reception centre by stating: ‘I want to 
keep eating soppressa [a local type of sausage] as I have always done and drinking my own 
wine’. Interestingly, however, two of the three LN mayors also explain that their institu-
tional role moderated their initial, more radical, anti-migrant, positions: 
Before being elected I had a more political and ideological approach to the issue. 
Then, when you have to make decisions, the approach changes significantly. For 
instance, I was against the SPRAR system (…) but after analysing it in detail, I 
changed my mind. The decisions you make as a mayor, despite being partly in-




Independent right-wing mayors, unlike LN mayors, explain that their institutional 
role did not influence their understandings and decisions. One of them states that, were 
he a private citizen, he would probably be the leader of an anti-migrant committee. An-
other mayor explains that his opposition to the reception of asylum-seekers in his village 
started before he was elected and that his position has not changed since then. 
The very strong sense of regional identity in Veneto also seems to explain why SUW 
policies became so popular there. Many mayors that do not oppose the reception of asy-
lum-seekers, particularly PD mayors, indeed, agree that opposition to immigration in 
the region is largely grounded on identitarian concerns. As a PD mayor puts it, ‘the Ve-
netian identity is based on contrapositions against those who come from outside’, and 
Venetians’ ‘industriousness’ and ‘aptitude for hard work’ are some of the elements upon 
which such contrapositions are built. The fact that most asylum-seekers are unemployed 
during asylum applications, as a Deputy Prefect interviewed puts it, ‘is not accepted in 
Venetian culture’. Making asylum-seekers work for the community, therefore, assumes, 
in the region, a specific symbolic value. 
Understanding the Effects of Migration Flows  
To analyse which events and cues influence mayors’ sensemaking processes, 
mayors were asked about their perceptions of the effects of asylum-seeker reception in 
their municipality. Table 2 illustrates the findings of a frame analysis of actors’ re-
sponses, based on a typology of frames derived from the influential works of Helbling 
(2014: 25) and Benson and Wood (2015). 
Table 2. Frame analysis of mayors’ responses to questions investigating their perception of the effects 
of the reception of asylum-seekers (in bold: mayors of provincial capitals) 
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As expected, the interview material reveals that, while describing the effects of asy-
lum-seeker reception, most mayors focus on the many anti-migrant protests that have 
taken place in Veneto. Crucially, however, the five groups of mayors understand the 
causes of these protests in significantly different ways. 
Mayors affiliated to both the LN and the PD describe anti-migrant protests and lo-
cals’ hostility towards asylum-seekers as an unavoidable reaction to the presence of 
asylum-seekers which makes locals feel insecure. As a PD mayor explains, locals are 
‘hostile to migrants due to inherent fears of persons that are different from them’. As an 
LN mayor explains: 
The main effect has been a perception of insecurity among the citizens (…). Peo-
ple see the presence of these migrants as something that is imposed on them and 
that they don’t know how to face (…). And this perception of insecurity risks turn-
ing into xenophobia (LN mayor). 
Independent mayors, instead, frame these protests and locals’ hostility as the out-
come of specific events and dynamics. The two right-wing independent mayors, unlike 
LN mayors, adopt securitised frames and describe locals as ‘under threat’, because asy-
lum-seekers commit crimes and represent a risk to public health: 
A spate of crimes has broken out; crimes are increasing, particularly those of a 
sexual nature (…). The asylum-seekers are causing abnormal social malaise. 
Some of them went to the doctor and everybody ran out of the clinic, especially 
older people, and the doctor didn’t know which medical checks these migrants 
had done (Independent right-wing mayor). 
Independent centre-left and independent centre-right mayors, instead, explain 
that the main effect of the dispersal of asylum-seekers in Veneto has been increased ten-
sion between local institutions, which has led to a very inefficient management of the 
reception of asylum-seekers and a high level of politicisation of the issue. The anti-mi-
grant protests are mostly perceived by these mayors as the consequence of these 
institutional tensions, of the anti-migrant propaganda campaigns of the far-right, which 
received vast coverage in local media, and the unbalanced dispersal of asylum-seekers. 
These different understandings of the effects of asylum-seeker reception on public 
opinion and of the causes of the anti-migrant protests, have important implications for 
mayors’ decisions to develop (or not) SUW policies and powerfully influence the type of 
measures implemented. They clearly explain why PD and LN mayors, particularly con-
cerned about public reactions to asylum-seeker reception, have developed SUW policies 
with the main goal of being seen to do something to address citizens’ perceptions of in-
security. It also explains why they want these activities to be highly visible. A PD deputy 
mayor explains that she had long suggested the idea to develop SUW projects without 
being supported by the mayor, but that, at some point, the mayor suddenly changed his 
mind ‘when he perceived the rising social tension around asylum-seeker reception’. 
Similar political and symbolic considerations influenced the only LN mayor to imple-
ment the policy. In the case of the two LN mayors that did not develop SUW policies, a 
similar assessment of the problem did not lead to the same solutions. Interestingly, both 
these mayors had to deal with a more limited number of asylum-seekers and did not per-
ceive the citizens’ sense of insecurity as undermining their public support. 
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Conversely, the conviction of independent centre-left and centre-right mayors that 
anti-migrant protests are a consequence of the inefficiencies of the reception system and 
of the lack of information about the issue, leads them to identify other policy solutions.9 
All of them, indeed, unlike PD mayors, actively tried to combat people’s hostility through 
information campaigns or public events with experts. They have also taken a more pro-
active role in trying to better organize the regional reception system. As one of them 
explains, ‘what we did was to try to coordinate the reception system in our province, go-
ing beyond our formal competences’. Public opinion, therefore, plays a minor role in 
these mayors’ decisions to develop SUW projects: as an independent centre-right mayor 
puts it, ‘our decision had nothing to do with public opinion. I feel ashamed when I hear 
people around me saying that the solution is to have them clean the streets’. Also, these 
understandings clearly explain why these mayors are much less concerned about the vis-
ibility of SUW policies.  
Finally, the analysis provides useful insights into why independent right-wing 
mayors so harshly oppose SUW policies: being convinced that asylum-seekers represent 
a real threat to public security, they oppose any initiative that allows them to get closer to 
the citizens. 
The Influence of Past Experiences  
The analysis of the retrospective element of sensemaking provides interesting in-
sights into why local governments propose different types of activities for asylum-
seekers and why they do so with long-term or short-term policy goals.  
While replying to questions designed to grasp how they made sense of the refugee 
crisis, most mayors do not make any reference to past events. Rather, they seem to per-
ceive recent flows as an entirely new phenomenon, despite Veneto having received 
significant migrant flows in the past three decades. In line with expectations, this ab-
sence of previous definitions of the situation leads to reluctance to make plans and 
projections. Most mayors interviewed, indeed, describe asylum-seeking migration as an 
overwhelming phenomenon beyond their control and speak about the future in very anx-
ious terms. Many are concerned about the possibility that the asylum-seekers will settle 
in their municipality after the asylum procedure. 
This lack of planning and forecasting, at odds with the urgent need to provide solu-
tions, suggests the potential for reactive tendencies in local asylum policy-making. Most 
interviewed mayors, in fact, seem to have internalized the idea of being passive respond-
ents rather than active shapers of asylum policies. As a PD mayor explains: 
We don’t have the instruments. Problems arise, and no ideas about how to deal 
with them have been previously developed. I think we are dealing with a matter 
for which we were not prepared (…). We make urgent, emergency decisions (PD 
mayor). 
This helps to explain why most mayors implement SUW policies in a reactive man-
ner, as emergency measures and without any long-term planning.  
                                                             
9 The analysis does not allow us to assess the cause of these different perceptions. This might be due to the 
presence of strong inputs from the parties or mayors’ different aspirations to pursue a political career at 
the national level. 
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Conversely, the availability of past experiences in the management of asylum or 
similar issues helps to explain why the three independent centre-left mayors (and one of 
the independent centre-right mayors) implemented SUW policies with different policy 
goals. These four mayors, indeed, during the interview, refer to lessons from the past that 
helped them to make decisions during the asylum crisis. One of them explains that when 
the Prefect suddenly decided to send 90 asylum-seekers to his village, the previous expe-
rience of his municipality within the SPRAR system helped him to manage the 
unexpected event: 
After 15 years of experience with the SPRAR system, we knew that this system 
and the diffused reception model worked: we had to recover that model and de-
velop it further (Independent centre-left mayor). 
Importantly, these four mayors, unlike the others, are less afraid of the impact of 
asylum-seeking flows on their municipalities, and keener to make future projections and 
recommend innovative policy solutions:  
I think the most important thing is to understand that immigration is a struc-
tural phenomenon that will continue for the next 30-40 years. We have the social 
policy areas of disability, mental health, seniority, we have and will have the one 
of immigration. We must govern it through three-year programmes in a struc-
tural manner, building networks between municipalities, as we do in these other 
areas (Independent centre-left mayor). 
Interestingly, the availability of past experiences also seems to influence the imple-
mentation of SUW policies. Three of these mayors, indeed, explicitly mention that they 
initially replicated similar initiatives that had been implemented in previous years with 
asylum-seekers hosted in the SPRAR centres or with other groups of disadvantaged in-
dividuals. Their tendency to project into the future helps to explain why they implement 
SUW policies with more long-term policy goals. 
Social Network Analysis 
Figure 2 illustrates the findings of a social network analysis elaborated with the 
Gephi software using data collected through structured questionnaires filled in by the 
ten interviewed mayors who implemented SUW policies. The questionnaire investigates 
their interactions and discussions about asylum-related issues with other actors in the 
asylum governance system, the frequency of these interactions, and the degree of simi-
larity or difference in actors’ perspectives on asylum-related issues.10 The four networks 
illustrate the connections of the different groups of mayors, with each node representing 
a category of actors with whom mayors discussed asylum-related issues. The size of the 
nodes and the weight of ties are proportional to the frequency of their interactions (the 
more frequent the exchange, the bigger the nodes). The colour of nodes depends on the 
degree of similarity of actors’ perspectives on asylum-related issues (red means signifi-
cant similarity, yellow means significant difference). In order to facilitate the 
comparison, all political actors have been positioned in the upper-left corner in all 
                                                             
10 Frequency is measured on a scale of 1-5 (occasionally; monthly; twice a month; weekly; daily). The de-
gree of similarity of views is also measured on a scale of 1-5. 
ANDREA PETTRACHIN 
 15 
graphs; institutional actors in the upper-right corner; service providers, media and ex-
perts in the lower-right corner; and advocacy actors in the lower-left corner. 




Figure 3. Interactions of the three PD mayors with other actors in the asylum governance system. 
 
The SNA allows us to investigate Weick’s fourth property of sensemaking, accord-
ing to which sensemaking is contingent on interactions with other actors. It provides 
interesting information about those actors that, having frequent contacts with the 
mayors and sharing similar views on asylum-related issues, plausibly influence how 
SUW policies are implemented. Not surprisingly, all mayors have close interactions with 
the main actors involved in the organization of the reception system – the prefectures, 
and service providers – while the frequent discussions with other mayors help to explain 
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the quick diffusion of SUW policies. The frequency of mayors’ interactions with other 
actors, instead, varies significantly, as does the degree of similarity of their views on asy-
lum-related issues. Independent centre-left mayors have close relationships with local 
pro-migrant NGOs and other advocates of asylum-seeker reception, actors with whom 
they also share similar perspectives. This helps to explain why they adopt rights-based 
approaches while implementing SUW policies and why migrant integration is their 
main policy goal. PD mayors, instead, have close relationships with the Ministry of the 
Interior and less frequent interactions with advocacy actors, which helps to explain why 
they develop SUW policies in ways that seem more in line with national guidelines.  
Figure 4. Interactions of the three independent centre-right mayors with other actors in the asylum 
governance system. 
 





Independent centre-right mayors, compared to the other groups, seem to face less 
pressure from non-governmental actors and, rather, have close relationships with ex-
perts (e.g. researchers, experienced civil servants and practitioners). Also, they do not 
share similar views on asylum-related issues with any of the actors with whom they in-
teract (with the exception of the Catholic Church). These elements help to explain their 
more pragmatic policy approach, less influenced by external pressures. 
The close interactions of the only LN mayor to implement SUW policies with jour-
nalists, finally, seems to be linked to his willingness to be seen as opposing the Prefect’s 
decision to allocate asylum-seekers to his municipality. After he decided to implement 
SUW policies, he also released several interviews on the issue to local newspapers, dur-
ing which he explained that these policies were aimed at improving citizens’ security. 
6. Conclusions 
This article has examined policies for the involvement of asylum-seekers in socially use-
ful works in fourteen municipalities in Veneto, investigating how, why and with what 
goals this policy was developed. The main aim is to generate hypotheses for future re-
search. The analysis leads to three main concluding remarks.  
First, the article has shown that only some of the selected local administrations im-
plemented SUW policies in Veneto and that they involved asylum-seekers in different 
types of activities, from very low-skilled auxiliary jobs to more professionalising activi-
ties. Importantly, it has also shown that mayors’ political affiliations (more than other 
variables) in the selected municipalities, is a strong predictor of their decisions to imple-
ment SUW policies and of the type of measures implemented. To formulate proper 
generalisations, this finding should be tested in future research on a higher number of 
cases and in other regional and national contexts.  
Second, the article has shown that mayors’ policy goals also vary significantly. 
Mayors, therefore, do not passively implement the measures promoted by the national 
government. In doing so, they follow their own agenda and adapt national-level guide-
lines to their own aims in a way that powerfully shapes the policies developed and their 
outcomes. Independent centre-left mayors develop SUW policies with the aim of inte-
grating migrants in the local community. Independent centre-right mayors adopt more 
pragmatic approaches. PD and LN mayors develop SUW policies with the main aim of 
being seen to do something to reduce citizens’ perceptions of insecurity. This finding is 
consistent with well-established findings in the literature on public policy analysis 
(Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973). 
Third, the article sheds light on processes of meaning-production and decision-
making, in order to understand how and why they decide to develop SUW policies, why 
they implement different types of measures and why they do so with different policy 
goals. To do so, it has applied insights from Weick’s sensemaking approach, which is par-
ticularly relevant to the study of decision-making processes in situations of crisis. The 
analysis has crucially shown that mayors are not ‘passive recipients of information, but 
active interpreters and rationalizers’ (Mutz, 2007: 91). Decisions about the implementa-
tion of SUW policies are significantly influenced by mayors’ diverse understandings of 
the anti-migrant protests around them and interpretations of their causes, by different 
identity processes, and by their diverse past experiences and social relations.  
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The decisions of PD and LN mayors to implement SUW policies are reactive re-
sponses to the protests and the perceived hostility of the local population towards 
migrants. Such hostility is perceived to be increased by the sight of asylum-seekers loi-
tering within reception centres, particularly unacceptable in the Venetian society, 
where ‘industriousness’ and ‘aptitude for hard work’ are defining elements of a very 
strong sense of regional identity. Making asylum-seekers work for the community, 
therefore, in these mayors’ eyes, is a policy that has the potential to meet locals’ approval 
and reduce their discontent. These understandings significantly influence the imple-
mentation of SUW policies in these municipalities, which mostly involve very low-
skilled jobs, highly visible to the local population. 
Independent mayors, conversely, are much less influenced by public opinion. Inde-
pendent centre-left mayors’ decisions to develop SUW policies in ways that are primarily 
aimed at fostering migrants’ integration seem to be significantly influenced and shaped 
by relevant past experiences of dealing with asylum-seeking migration and their close 
connections with pro-migrant NGOs. The more pragmatic policy approach of independ-
ent centre-right mayors seems to be linked with the absence of pressure from both pro-
migrant and public opinion. 
These findings complement and challenge the assumptions of the (scant) existing liter-
ature on local decision-making processes on asylum-related issues. It shows, indeed, that 
asylum policies, at least in situations of crisis, do not necessarily have ‘an objective ba-
sis’, in terms of quantifying local economic costs and benefits and demographic effects 
on the community, as shown by Steen (2016: 466). It has also illustrated the potential of 
applying sensemaking approaches to understand local asylum policy-making processes, 
compared to cognitive approaches that more narrowly focus on policy frames analysis 
(Lidén and Nyhlén, 2015). Following Fiss and Hirsh (2005: 31), while ‘framing focuses 
on whose meanings win out in symbolic contests’, applying sensemaking in this article 
has allowed us to ‘shift the focus to understanding why such frame contests come into 
being in the first place, and over which territory they are fought’. Future research should 
move from these findings and further explore sensemaking processes in other contexts 
and policy fields. 
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